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This paper analyzes the effects of bank mergers on bank-firm relationships. Using 
matched bank-firm level data, I find that mergers disrupt lending relationships, specially 
to small borrowers of target banks. However, I find significant positive effects of 
mergers for borrowers that continue the lending relationship with the consolidated bank. 
On average, consolidated banks reduce loan interest rates. The most beneficial mergers 
from the borrower point of view are those involving two large banks and commercial 
banks. While the reduction in interest rates is larger when the acquirer and the target 
have some market overlap, the decline is much smaller when there is a significant 
increase in local banking market concentration. 
JEL Classification: G21, G34 
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Non-technical summary 
During the last decade, a consolidation process of the European banking industry has 
been under way. In the period between January 1996 and December 2005 European 
banks spent €682bn (816 deals) acquiring banking businesses throughout the world. Far 
of being an isolated fact, almost everywhere banks have been getting bigger through 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). For instance, in the U.S. the ten biggest commercial 
banks control 49% of the country's banking assets, up from 29% a decade ago. This 
market concentration has raised the concern among policy makers, regulators and 
academics that small businesses may find it harder to obtain finance from larger and 
more complex financial institutions. 
This paper analyzes the potential positive and negative effects of bank mergers to small 
business borrowers: Do bank mergers harm or benefit firm borrowers? The study 
focuses on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) for two reasons: first, banks are 
especially important for SMEs as they represent these firms’ principal source of external 
finance, and second, because the value of relationship lending, which is based on close 
ties between banks and borrowers, is likely to be higher for these firms. Given the 
importance of SMEs to create employment and foster innovation, any impact of bank 
mergers on SMEs may have important policy implications. 
One argument commonly used in favor of mergers in banking, as in many other 
industries, is the pursuit of economies of scale and scope and increased diversification 
opportunities. Borrowers will benefit to the extent that consolidated banks pass on 
efficiency gains to them. However, bank mergers increase market concentration. 
Borrowers will be harmed to the extent that consolidated banks exert their market 
power. In addition to this traditional merger trade-off, small business lending is 
characterized by the role of lenders on gathering and generating information about 
borrowers through long lasting lending relationships that help overcome informational 
asymmetries in credit markets. A priori, bank mergers could foster or inhibit lending 
relationships.  
This paper provides evidence on the costs and benefits of bank mergers to small 
businesses using a sample of Spanish firms. On one hand, mergers are harmful to small 
businesses because lending relationships are more likely to be disrupted following a 
merger. Small borrowers of target banks have a higher probability of having terminated 
a relationship with the consolidated bank. Moreover, small borrowers find it harder to 
start new lending relationship with consolidated banks. In sum, the higher termination 
rate for existing borrowers is not compensated with a higher initiation rate of new 
lending relationships with small business after the merger.  
On the other hand, continuing borrowers benefit from mergers in terms of reduced loan 
rates. Small and young firms enjoy the highest decline in interest rates. The most 
beneficial mergers from the borrower point of view are those involving two large banks. 
This result is not consistent with the existence of a “size effect” in lending, that is, that 
big (small) banks tend to prefer to lend to big (small) borrowers. While the reduction in 
interest rates is larger when the acquirer and the target banks have some market overlap 
(in-market) and, consequently, more potential for cost savings, the decline is much 
smaller when there is significant increase in local banking market concentration. That is, 
the change in local market concentration determines the extent to which efficiency gains 6
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are passed on to borrowers. From a policy perspective, this result hints at a potential 
concern if banking consolidation keeps up the same pace. The degree of banking 
concentration in some Spanish provinces is currently quite high, the majority of banks 
have a presence in almost all Spanish provinces, and thus there is little room for 
additional out-of-market mergers within Spain. One may expect that if more in-market 
bank mergers occur the sign of the effect of mergers on interest rates may reverse.  
 
Even though this study only uses Spanish data and focuses on within-country mergers, 
some implications can be derived for the integration of the European banking market. In 
particular, the analysis of in-market versus out-of-market mergers can be viewed as a 
control environment to compare the effects of domestic mergers versus cross-country 
mergers where the institutional and regulatory variables are held constant.  
 
The predictions of the effects of domestic mergers (within borders) on small businesses 
depend on the degree of concentration of each country banking market. In the 90s, many 
European countries experienced a wave of domestic M&A. This consolidation process 
has clearly led to an increased banking concentration within individual European 
countries. Domestic consolidation was based on the conviction that a strong domestic 
market is necessary before moving abroad and on the policy of creating “national 
champions” (Group of Ten 2001). As a result, the scale and market share of banks 
increased within borders. In light of the results presented in the paper, one should 
expect only small benefits of domestic M&A for small businesses.  
 
After peaking in 1999, the value of European domestic banking deals has been in 
decline. Interestingly, since 2003 the value of European cross-border deals has been 
rising year after year. There are a number of reasons to believe that cross-border 
banking consolidation will increase in Europe during the coming years. The larger 
players in some countries are unlikely to grow through further domestic M&A because 
their markets have become increasingly concentrated. For some time now, the European 
Commission has focused on the removal of impediments to European cross-border 
banking consolidation. The enlargement of the European Union is expected to increase 
the level of cross-border M&A activity involving banks with an appetite for exposure to 
higher growth markets. Indeed, approximately one-third of the number of bank M&A 
deals in Europe over the last ten years has involved banks in western Europe acquiring 
all or part of banks in emerging Europe (central and eastern Europe, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, the Baltic States and Turkey) (Pricewaterhouse 2006). The 
results in the paper show that out-of-market mergers generate some efficiency gains, 
probably in terms of greater risk diversification, which are passed along to borrowers. In 
light of this analysis, one should expect that small businesses will benefit from 
increased cross-border M&A. 7
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1. Introduction 
The current trend of banking consolidation both within countries and cross-borders has 
raised concerns that small business may find it harder to obtain finance from 
increasingly large and complex financial institutions.  Small and informationally opaque 
firms, highly dependent on banking finance to undertake their projects, would be the 
most directly affected. A noticeable acceleration in consolidation activity in the last 
decade has encouraged the proliferation of empirical studies that contribute to this 
debate. Most of these studies analyze banks’ aggregate effects because little data on 
individual small borrowers is available. This paper adds to a less developed strand of 
the literature by analyzing the impact of bank consolidation on borrowers of merging 
banks by using data on bank-firm relationships in Spain.
1  
 
Bank mergers have the potential to either benefit or harm borrowers. On the one hand, 
mergers may generate efficiency gains - cost savings, revenue enhancing, and greater 
bank size can yield economies of scale and scope and increase diversification 
opportunities-. Borrowers will benefit to the extent that consolidated banks pass on 
efficiency gains to them. On the other hand, bank mergers increase market 
concentration. Borrowers will be harmed to the extent that consolidated banks exert 
their market power. In addition to this traditional merger trade-off, small business 
lending is characterized by the role of lenders on gathering and generating soft 
information about borrowers through long lasting lending relationships that help 
overcome informational asymmetries in credit markets. A priori, bank mergers could 
foster or inhibit lending relationships.  
 
This paper analyzes the potential positive and negative effects of bank mergers to small 
business borrowers: Do bank mergers harm or benefit firm borrowers? In particular, the 
paper sheds light to the following questions: Are consolidated banks more likely to 
terminate their relationships with borrowers? What are the consequences of bank 
consolidation on interest rates? Are some particular types of borrowers more likely to be 
                                                 
1 Studies on the impact of bank mergers to small business using detailed bank-firm data are Sapienza 
(2002), Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2005) for Italy, Degryse et al. (2006) for Belgium and Erel (2006), 
and Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) for the U.S.. 8
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adversely affected by banking mergers? Are some particular types of mergers more 
likely to adversely affect SMEs? 
 
The empirical analysis is divided into two main parts. First, I examine whether banking 
consolidation disrupts lending relationships. I estimate the probability of terminating 
existing lending relationships with merging banks and also examine whether it is harder 
for small businesses seeking new funding sources to establish a new lending 
relationship with consolidated banks. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to 
document initiation of lending relationships by consolidated banks. Second, I analyze 
the effect of banking mergers on average loan interest rates. If bank mergers create 
efficiency gains that are passed on to borrowers, loan rates for merging bank borrowers 
would decline.
2 If the increase in market power outweighs merger gains, then the 
opposite sign would be observed.  
 
I find several interesting results. Firms who borrow from target banks are more likely to 
lose their credit relationship with the consolidated bank than would otherwise identical 
borrowers from non-merging banks. Target borrowers are the ones who suffer the most 
in terms of relationship termination. I also find that borrowers seeking to start a new 
lending relationship have lower probability of initiating it with a consolidated bank than 
with other non-merging banks. That is, small businesses find it harder to get a loan from 
consolidated banks. These results suggest a somewhat negative effect of bank mergers 
to small businesses.  
 
The second part of the analysis examines the effect of mergers on interest rates. The 
main result is that interest rates decrease when one of the lending banks participates in a 
merger. The decline in interest rates suggests that mergers are beneficial for borrowers 
that continue the lending relationship with the merging bank. This result supports the 
view that banking mergers generate efficiency gains which to some extent are passed on 
to small businesses.  
 
                                                 
2 This is an indirect approach to measure merger gains that does not allow to distinguish between profit 
efficiency, cost efficiency, diversification gains, etc. In the remainder of the paper I interpret a reduction 
on interest rates following a merger as efficiency gains. 9
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Having identified an overall beneficial effect of bank mergers on interest rates of 
continuing borrowers, I focus on examining its relevance and heterogeneity through 
various dimensions. First, I analyze whether the effect on interest rates is temporary or 
permanent. One might argue that a temporary decline may just reflect, for instance, 
some strategic price cuts to extend the market share rather than reveal more 
fundamental operational improvements in the consolidated bank. I find support for a 
permanent reduction on interest rates, which reinforces the evidence that mergers 
benefit continuing borrowers.  
Second, I find that the average reduction in loan spreads is larger for target borrowers 
than for acquirer borrowers. Since acquiring banks are usually more efficient than target 
banks, this result provides support for the hypothesis of efficiency gains of mergers that 
benefit target borrowers the most.  
Third, I explore the “size effect” in lending. There is an extensive literature that 
explores whether small banks tend to lend to small businesses and large banks tend to 
lend to large businesses. If that is the case, larger banks resulting from banking 
consolidation may severely impact the credit availability and contract terms for small 
firms (Peek and Rosengren 1998, Berger et al. 1998, Strahan and Weston 1998). I find 
that the largest decline in interest rates corresponds to mergers involving the largest 
banks, which contradicts the “size effect”. Interestingly, I find large drops in interest 
rates of borrowers of small target banks that are acquired by a large bank. This suggests 
that small borrowers of small banks are prime beneficiaries from transferring the 
lending relationship to a larger bank. 
Fourth, I explore the heterogeneous effects of ownership form of merging banks. To my 
knowledge, this is the first paper to address this issue. Spanish banks differ on their 
form of ownership and governance structure. Commercial banks are shareholder-
oriented banks while saving banks have the ownership form of a private foundation 
(Crespí et al. 2004). Consistent with the property rights view, the largest reductions in 
interest rates are for target borrowers when two commercial banks merge.  
Five, I find heterogeneous effects of bank mergers depending on the degree of market 
overlap. In-market mergers (involving banks that previously operated in the same 10
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geographical area) benefit target borrowers the most; out-of-market mergers benefit 
acquiring borrowers the most. Finally, I also find evidence of a market power effect. 
Mergers that induce a significant increase in local market concentration have a smaller 
impact on interest rates, reflecting the fact that consolidated banks may exploit their 
market power. Nevertheless, the market power effect is never large enough to offset 
efficiency gains.  
I obtain interesting insights by dividing the sample according to the size of the 
borrower. I find that the smallest borrowers in the sample who are clients of target 
banks have a higher probability of having their lending relationship with the 
consolidated bank terminated and have a lower probability to initiate a new relationship 
with consolidated banks. I also find that the smallest and youngest borrowers in the 
sample that continue the lending relationship are the ones who enjoy higher interest rate 
declines. Taken together, these results suggest that smallest firms are disproportionally 
harmed by bank mergers in terms of loan supply, but those that continue the relationship 
benefit from having a relationship with a more efficient bank.  
In sum, the results in this paper show that bank mergers have the potential to both harm 
and benefit SMEs. On the one had, the findings suggest a negative effect of bank 
mergers in terms of an increased likelihood of terminating a lending relationship for 
target banks. On the positive side, firms that continue the relationship with the 
consolidated bank experience the highest reduction on interest rate.  
As stated above, the data is for Spanish firms in period 1996-2005. It is interesting to 
analyze this country because the relationship lending technology is widely used in 
Spanish credit markets, compared to other countries like the U.S.. The period analyzed 
is sufficiently large to capture banking consolidation due to two main reasons. First, the 
implantation of the Single European Market in 1992 and the culmination of the process 
of deregulation of the Spanish banking sector, with the special incidence of the 
liberalization of cross-province branching for savings banks which allowed them to 
open branches in any province or region since 1988. Second, the large number of 
mergers and acquisitions that have taken place during this period, some of them 
involving the largest banks, like Banco Santander and Banco Central Hispano (1999) 
and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya and Argentaria (1999), among many others. The analysis of 11
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lending relationships is particularly relevant in Spain because, like in others bank-based 
economies, banks are the most important providers of external finance to firms. I focus 
on SMEs for two reasons: first, banks are especially important for SMEs as they 
represent these firms’ principal source of external finance, and second, because the 
value of relationship lending, which is based on a bank officer gathering soft 
information, is likely to be higher for these firms. Hence, any impact of bank mergers 
on SMEs may have important policy implications. 
This paper contributes to the literature on banking consolidation and its effects to small 
businesses. Many of these papers rely on aggregate lending data from U.S. banks (Peek 
and Rosengren 1998, Berger et al. 1998, Strahan and Weston 1998). There is a small 
but growing literature that analyzes bank mergers from the small borrower perspective. 
Sapienza (2002) uses a loan-level data set for Italy to analyze dynamic effects of bank 
mergers. She finds that in-market mergers involving relatively small targets result in 
lower interest rates charged on loans and that mergers increase the probability of 
borrowers being cut off their credit lines. Erel (2006) performs a similar analysis for the 
U.S. and finds that interest rates decline after bank mergers. This paper is similar to 
Sapienza (2002) and Erel (2006) in exploring the effect of mergers on relationship 
termination and loan prices. One of the main contributions of this paper is the use of 
firm level data to control for borrower size instead of relying on loan size as a proxy. 
This reveals to be particularly relevant to study firm size/bank-size relation. Consistent 
with their findings, my results show a decline of interest rates after a bank merger. 
Unlike the U.S. and Italy, the decline in interest rate for small Spanish firms is observed 
even when large banks with market overlap merge.  
Some related studies on bank mergers at the firm level are Bonaccorsi and Patti (2007) 
that analyze the impact of mergers on credit availability in Italy. They look at 
heterogeneous effects by borrower characteristics. They fail to find evidence on stronger 
effects for borrowers that are small, more risky and dependent on fewer lenders. Using a 
Belgium dataset, Degryse et al. (2006) analyze bank-firm relationships and find 
heterogeneous impacts of mergers. Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) use a survey of small 
U.S. firms in 1995 and find that banking mergers had no significant effect on 
availability of credit or loan contract terms to small firms. 12
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the main features 
of the consolidation process in the Spanish banking market in the last decade. Section 3 
describes the data and the sample. Section 4 analyzes whether banking consolidation 
disrupts lending relationships. Section 5 examines the price effect of mergers on the 
continuing borrowers of the consolidated institutions. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Banking consolidation in Spain 
 
This paper studies the impact of bank mergers on lending relationships and loan interest 
rates to non-financial Spanish firms in the period 1996-2005. The period analyzed is 
characterized by intense merger activity involving banks of all sizes and of different 
ownership form. In 1996, firms in the sample had 23.5 percent of lending relationships 
with large banks; by the end of the sample this figure has increased to 56 percent. The 
Spanish banks also differ in ownership form. There are three main types of institutions: 
commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives, which compete under equal 
conditions in the loan, deposit and financial service markets. Commercial and savings 
banks are much more important than cooperatives. Together, they account for more than 
95% of the loan and deposit markets. In this paper, I focus in these two types. 
Commercial banks are companies owned by shareholders which hold the residual 
decision rights. Savings banks are not-for-profit commercial organizations whose 
profits are either retained or paid as a social dividend and the decision rights correspond 
to public authorities, depositors, workers, and the founding entity. I do not consider 
credit cooperatives in the analysis, which may be regarded as mutual thrifts. 
Additionally, official credit institutions are public entities created by the Spanish 
government to promote savings, economic growth, access to credit, improve wealth 
distribution, enhance strategic economic activities, etc.
3 The particular ownership 
structure of savings banks implies that there is no market for corporate control for this 
                                                 
3 In 1872 Banco Hipotecario was created by an act of parliament to provide long-term loans for property. 
In 1909 Caja Postal was set up as a public entity and started operations in 1916, based on savings books. 
A combination of public and private interests set up Banco de Crédito Local in 1925 in the form of a 
joint-stock company. Its purpose was to finance local authorities and other public institutions. Banco 
Exterior was created in 1929 to encourage foreign trade, to seek new markets for Spanish products and to 
help local companies with imports and exports. Argentaria was created in 1998 as a result of the merger 
of Banco Exterior, Banco Hipotecario, Caja Postal and Corporación Bancaria de España. 13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 934
September 2008
organizations and hence they cannot be acquired by commercial banks.
4 During the 
sample period, savings banks increased significantly the number of lending 
relationships with SMEs from 26 percent in 1996 to 35 percent in 2005. Most notably, 
the number of lending relationships with large savings banks rose from zero (there are 
no large savings banks in 1996) to 11 percent.  
 
I analyze all within-country mergers that occurred between 1996 to 2005. Table 1 
provides the complete list of mergers,
5 and table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the 
banks in the sample classified as target, acquired and consolidated bank. The year of the 
merger is that in which the consolidated bank provided unified financial statements. The 
classification of whether a bank is an acquirer or target is based on the classification 
provided by the Registry of Financial Entities. As a general rule, the acquirer is the 
financial institution whose entity code is passed to the consolidated bank (but there are 
few exceptions). 
 
According to the Group of Ten report (2001), the most important forces encouraging 
consolidation are improvements in information technology, financial deregulation, 
globalization of financial and real markets, and increased shareholder pressure for 
financial performance. In Spain, starting in the mid-1980s, regulations such as interest 
rate controls, branching restrictions, solvency and investment requirements, accounting 
rules and entry constraints were relaxed. This lead to a branching expansion strategy 
through mergers with banks operating in different provinces. In the report, Spanish 
bankers affirm that banking mergers are needed to face the upcoming European 
consolidation that is expected to take place. In light of these arguments, it seems 
reasonable to assume that Spanish banking consolidation was mainly driven by 
deregulation and a policy of creating “national champions” to expand scale and market 
share (Carbó et al. 2007). Finally, it is important to mention that the completion of 
mergers of existing banks is subject to authorization by the Spanish Minister of 
                                                 
4 See Crespí  et al. (2004) for a comprehensive discussion on governance mechanisms in Spanish banks. 
5 The merger between Activobank and Banco de Sabadell is included in the merger list for completeness, 
however, none of the firms in our sample borrows from Activobank, and hence, no analysis can be done 
with respect to that merger at the borrower level (Activobank was operating in Spain during three years 
from 2000 to 2002, with only one and two branches). 14
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I use three sources of data. The primary source of firm-level information is the SABI 
(Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) database by Bureau Van Dijk. This database 
includes accounting and financial information for more than 600,000 Spanish firms for 
the period 1990 to 2005 that was obtained from the annual financial statements 
deposited at the Registry of Companies. The number of firms included in the database 
has been increasing with time as a result of increased effort to compile a comprehensive 
database. To be included in the database the firm must have at least one employee. Even 
though it is not a stratified sample, the included firms are representative of the whole 
population of Spanish firms. Apart from accounting data, there is also some 
complementary information about the firms, like headquarters location, date of 
constitution, firm industry, number of employees, legal form of the business, the 
opinion of the auditor, whether the firm quotes in the stock exchange and the name of 
the banks with whom the firm usually operates. 
7
The SABI database is updated regularly. The historical series are not available for some 
variables, such as the names of the lenders (only the current observation of the variable 
is kept in the database). In order to have a complete panel dataset on the lending 
relationships I recoded this variable from previous updates of the database, one per year, 
from 1998 to 2007. With this procedure, I recovered information on the firm lenders 
from 1996 to 2005, which determines the period of analysis. Firms that report lending 
relationships with two branches of the same bank are considered as having one lending 
relationship with that financial institution. The identity of the banks lending to these 
firms is matched with data on bank merger activity from the Bank of Spain Registry of 
Financial Entities (Renbe). This database keeps record of relevant events that entail a 
                                                
6 Banco de España, 2001, “Basic Regulatory Structure of the Spanish Banking System”, Annex I to 
Annual Report. 
7 The variable “name of banks” is crucial for the analysis. Unfortunately, the only available information is 
the name of the banks with whom the firm usually operates with no other details. In particular, it does not 
allow to identify lending banks from banks providing other type of financial services. A firm is defined to 
have a lending relationship with a lender when a firm reports the name of a bank in this variable. 15
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change on the entity code assigned by the Bank of Spain to any financial firm that 
operates in Spain, like new registered financial firms, banks that terminate operation, 
and to our interest, all mergers and acquisitions involving financial firms. By matching 
the information on the identity of the lenders from the SABI database with the bank 
mergers dates from the Registry of Financial Entities, I can identify the borrowers of 
merging banks. This information would be crucial to examine the impact of the merging 
activity of lending banks to its borrowers.  
The bank level data is obtained from the publicly available financial statements 
contained in the Annual Statistics of the Spanish Banking Association (AEB) and the 
Annual Statistics of the Spanish Savings Banks Confederation (CECA). From these data 
sources we obtain financial statements of commercial and savings banks respectively, as 
well as information on the number of bank branches for each financial institution by 
province and year.  
3.1. Sample 
From the SABE database I select firms not listed in the stock exchange, with 
information on bank relationships, in all industrial sectors except finance, insurance and 
public firms
8 that during the period of analysis (1996-2005) complied with the SME 
condition according to the requirements established by the European Commission 
recommendation 2003/361/EC on the definition of small and medium-sized firms. 
Specifically, the sample of firms is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 
250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million, and/or an 
annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million. Within the SME category, a small 
enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose 
annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €10 million. A micro 
enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose 
annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €2 million. Firms 
need to have at least two consecutive observations to be included in the sample. If both 
                                                
8 In particular, we drop firms in the following industry sectors: Depository Institutions, Non-depository 
Credit Institutions, Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Services, Insurance 
Carriers, Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service, and Public Administration (SIC codes 60 to 64 and 90 
to 99). 16
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consolidated and non consolidated accounts are available, the non consolidated ones are 
used. All nominal values have been converted to real values by deflating by the 
consumer price index (2000=100). 
 
The final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firms in the period 1996-2005,
9 
with a total of 674,735 firm-year observations corresponding to 124,213 firms. The 
average number of observations per firm is 5.5, ranging from a maximum of 10 
observations for about 40 percent of the firms in the sample and just one observation 
(with lagged values) for 4 percent of the sample. The maximum number of firms is 
achieved in year 2005 with 90,734 observations in the sample, which represents 6.23 
percent of the total population of Spanish SME with at least one employee in that year. 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of some variables for the firms in the sample. 
 
In the analysis presented in section 4 the unit of analysis is a bank-firm relationship. 
The sample is comprised by 1,351,069 bank-firm-year observations corresponding to 
300,225 bank-firm relationships.  
 
The analysis on price effects of mergers in section 5 is conducted at the firm level. The 
dependent variable is the average interest rate that firms pay for external finance 
(Interest rate). For a given firm and year, the average interest rate is calculated by 
dividing the financial expenses at the end of the year by the average amount of debt held 
during that year (debt at the beginning of the year plus debt at the end of the year 
divided by two). This computation generates some extreme values in the average 
interest rate for some observations. Therefore, the variable is winsorized at the 99.5 
percentile, which corresponds to an interest rate of 23.88 percentage points (this 
procedure affects 3,061 firm-year observations). 
 
The data provides information on the name of the lenders, but there is no disaggregated 
information at the loan level. Although this data limitation prevents to measure the 
effect on interest rates of those loan granted by merging banks, it has the advantage that 
I can measure the impact on the average interest rate paid in subsequent periods even 
when the lending relationships is terminated. Existing research in Italy (Sapienza 2002), 
                                                 
9 Information corresponding to 1995 is also used to construct lagged variables of firm and bank 
characteristics. 17
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the U.S. (Erel 2005) and Belgium (Degryse et al. 2005) evidences higher 
discontinuation rates for target borrowers. My results in section 5 are consistent with 
this finding. The advantage of this dataset is that I can analyze the average interest rate 
that a firm pays even when the relationship is terminated. 
 
 
3.2. Definition of relevant market 
 
The next issue we need to address is the choice of relevant market where banks compete 
for clients. It is sensible to assume that competition among banks takes place at a 
regional level because usually small firms only operate at a local level and seek banking 
finance close to their location. Additionally, some research in other countries shows that 
the distance between the firm and its lenders is very low and it has not increased 
significantly with the implantation of the new information technologies. Therefore, I 
define the province where the firm is located as the relevant market where banks 
compete for borrowers, as in previous Spanish studies (e.g. Maudos 1998). Firms that 
have lending relationships with banks outside the province (relevant market) represent 
1.5% of the bank-firm-year observations (20,285 out of 1,351,069).  
 
4. The effect of bank mergers on termination and initiation of lending relationships 
 
The primary source of small business finance are banks, and usually, small firms tend to 
concentrate their borrowing at a single or few banks. Bank mergers may adversely 
affect small business if consolidating banks are more likely to terminate ongoing 
lending relationships with existing borrowers. Furthermore, banking consolidation can 
make it more difficult for small business seeking new financing sources to start a 
lending relationship with a newly consolidated financial institution. In this section I 
examine whether this is the case. For the first hypothesis, I estimate a probit model on 
the probability of terminating a relationship as a function of lenders’ merger activity. 
For the second hypothesis, I estimate a probit model for the probability of initiating a 
relationship as a function of lenders’ recent merger activity. 
 
The specifications of the models are the following: 18
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Pr(terminate relationshipikt)= F(Target borrowerikt, Acquirer borrowerikt, Firm 
controlsikt, Lender characteristicsikt, Time dummies, Province dummies, İit) 
(1) 
Pr(initiate relationshipikt)= F(Consolidated borrowerikt, Firm controlsikt, Lender 
characteristicsikt, Time dummies, Province dummies, İit) 
(2) 
where each observation represents a bank-firm relationship at time t. In the first model, 
the dependent variable Terminate relationshipikt equals one in year t if firm i does not 
report having a relationship with bank k in year t+1. In the second model, the dependent 
variable Initiate relationshipikt equals one in year t if firm i did not report having a 
relationship with bank k in year t-1. The explanatory variables that proxy for merging 
activity are the following. In the first model, the variable Target borrowerikt equals one 
if bank k is a target bank in a merger occurring between t and t+1. The variable 
Acquirer borrowerikt equals one if bank k is an acquirer bank in a merger occurring 
between t and t+1. In the second model, the variable Consolidated borrowerikt equals 
one if bank k is a consolidated bank resulting from a merger occurred between t-1 and t. 
Both models include a set of firm characteristics and lender characteristics. All 
regressions include year dummies and province dummies. İit is assumed to be a zero 
mean, randomly distributed error term. All reported coefficients are the marginal effects 
on the probability of discontinuing the lending relationship evaluated at the sample 
mean of the explanatory variables. 
Firm characteristics measured at t-1 are included in the model. The logarithm of total 
assets (Log firm assets) and of sales (Log firm sales) as measures of firm size. Some 
financial ratios: proportion of current assets over current liabilities (Liquidity), ratio of 
fixed assets over liabilities to control for the tangibility of its assets (Collateral), EBIT 
over assets to measure firm profitability (Firm ROA) and firm liabilities scaled by total 
assets (Leverage). I additionally include the Altman Z-score as independent variable in 
the regression to capture the firm credit risk.
10 This is a compound measure built from 
                                                
10 The Altman Z-score is calculated as: Z = 0.012 [working capital/assets] + 0.014 [retained 
earnings/assets] + 0.033 [EBIT/assets] + 0.006 [equity /liabilities] + 1 [sales/assets]. Although in the 19
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accounting ratios that helps to predict how close a firm is to bankruptcy (Altman 1968). 
A higher Z-score implies a lower default risk. I use the logarithm of age (Log firm age) 
to capture the effect of firm life cycle. The Number of lenders at t-1 is also included in 
the regression to control for the differential effects of firms with multiple relationships 
compared to firms with only one lending relationship.  
As for lender characteristics, I include bank size (Log lender assets) and bank 
profitability (Lender ROA). I also include dummies for bank size.
11 Finally, Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of bank branches by province and year is included in the 
regression as a measure of banking market concentration.
12  
4.1. Termination of lending relationships 
The sample consists of 1,351,069 bank-firm-year observations that correspond to 
300,225 bank-firm lending relationships. 3.78 percent of lending relationships are 
terminated during the sample period. The variable Target borrower equals one in 
28,431 observations; 7 percent of these relationships are terminated. The variable 
Acquirer borrower equals one for 140,438 observations and only 3.24 percent of these 
relationships are terminated. The descriptive evidence suggests a higher discontinuation 
rate for target borrowers. In order to check whether the results hold once we control for 
observable firm and lender characteristics I estimate model (1). The results can be found 
in panel A of table 4, column 1.
13 Target borrowers have a higher probability of 
terminating a relationship (+1.8 percentage points) while acquiring borrowers have a 
lower probability of terminating the relationship (-0.7 percentage points). Existing 
studies also find a higher discontinuation rate for target borrowers than for acquirer 
                                                                                                                                              
original model the fourth ratio is calculated by market value of capital / book value of debt, here we have 
used the alternative proposed by Scherr and Hulburt (2001): the book value (and not the market value) of 
equity. This is because the market value is not available in the case of SMEs. 
11 Following Delgado et al. (2007), banks are grouped into three size classes: small (€1000 million in total 
loans or less), medium (between €1000 and 25,000 million) and large (above €25,000 million). 
12 The HHI is a market concentration measure computed as the sum of the squares of each bank's market 
share for all banks in a market. The number of branches that each bank has in each province by year is 
used to compute the HHI because no information currently exists concerning the regional distribution of 
the representative variables of banking output (deposits, loans). Only regional branch distribution data are 
available. Therefore, market shares are calculated using regional branch distribution data which proxies 
for deposit distribution. 
13 The number of observations in the regressions is reduced to 1,142,521 due to missing values in some 
explanatory variables. 20
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borrowers (Sapienza 2002, Degryse et al. 2005). This finding suggests that target 
borrowers are the most hurt by banking consolidation. 
 
So far, I interpreted a discontinuation of a lending relationship as being a bank’s choice 
and being harmful from the borrower point of view. The reason for that interpretation is 
that the literature on lending relationships establishes that longer and stronger bank-firm 
relationships are value enhancing as it is reflected on a higher probability of obtaining a 
loan (Cole 1998), lower loan rates (Petersen and Rajan 1994, D’Auria et al. 1999), and 
lower collateral requirements (Berger and Udell 1995, Harhoff and Körting 1998). In 
light of these findings one would expect that continuing the lending relationship should  
be optimal from the borrower point of view. Moreover, in the next section I examine the 
effect of relationship termination and switching behavior on interest rates. The results 
show that continuing borrowers are the ones that benefit more from banking 
consolidation, which reinforces the interpretation that borrowers would prefer to 
continue the lending relationship if allowed to do so.  
 
However, as Korceski et al. (2006) argue, this might not always the case. When 
switching costs vary across different types of customers it is not obvious whether the 
welfare effect of continue/terminate a relationship with a consolidated bank is, on 
balance, positive or negative. On the one hand, firms with high switching costs do not 
terminate the relationship because they are locked in the relationship and find it difficult 
to start new lending relationships because of adverse selection problems in credit 
markets (Sharpe 1990, Rajan 1992). If that is the case, continue the relationship would 
be harmful from the borrower point of view. On the other hand, firms with low 
switching costs may find it profitable to drop the consolidated bank and start new 
lending relationships. It may even be the case that they do not need to start a new 
relationship and they just need to switch the funding amount from the merging bank to 
previously existing relationships. If this is the case, borrowers terminating the 
relationship with the merging bank will be better off. In this context, the coefficients in 
table 4 have no obvious interpretation. The higher probability of terminating a 
relationship for target borrowers may reflect the fact that target banks are generally 
weak and badly managed banks and thus they are also more likely to lose customers.
14 
                                                 
14 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out this caveat and suggesting how to address it. 21
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In that sense, the discontinuation of a lending relationship may reflect a borrower’s 
choice instead of a bank decision.  
In order to disentangle this competing interpretations, I divide the sample of firms into 
low and high quality borrowers using several observed characteristics. In the scenario of 
a weak target bank, one would expect that all types of firms (low and high quality) will 
decide to terminate the lending relationship with the target bank. On the contrary, if 
banks take the decision to terminate the lending relationship, one should observe banks 
severing relationships with low quality firms. I estimate model (1) with the variables 
Target borrower and Acquirer borrower interacted with three dummy variables (D1, 
D2, D3) that proxy for firm quality: size, age and z-score. 
The results can be found in columns 2 to 4 in panel A, table 4. The regressions show 
that target borrowers have a higher probability of terminating a relationship while 
acquiring borrowers have a lower probability of terminating the relationship. The last 
two rows test the equality of the coefficients Target*D1 and Target*D3. For size and 
age the null hypothesis is rejected, which shows that smaller and younger firms are 
more likely to terminate a relationship with a target bank. This result is consistent with 
Degryse et al. (2006). When firms are divided according to the z-score (column 4) the 
difference is no longer significant at 5%. Taken together the results support the 
hypothesis that the most informationally opaque firms are the ones that are more hurt by 
lending relationship discontinuation as a consequence of mergers. It seems plausible to 
assume that banks are generally the ones who terminate lending relationships with small 
businesses.  
The regression controls for firm characteristics. Larger, older, more levered, more 
profitable and firms with more lenders have a higher probability that the lending 
relationship is terminated. More liquid and less risky, as measured by the Z-score, have 
a lower probability. The regression also controls for bank characteristics. The most 
significant effect is for bank profitability. More profitable lenders are much less likely 
to terminate the lending relationship than unprofitable ones. This coefficient is basically 22
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capturing bank bankruptcy. Larger banks are less likely to terminate lending 
relationships than their smaller counterparts.
15
4.2. Initiation of lending relationships 
During the sample period, firms establish 69,975 new bank-firm lending relationships. 
9.48 percent correspond to new lending relationships with a consolidated bank in the 
year of the merger. In this section I estimate initiation rates for consolidated banks and 
non-consolidated banks in order to test whether banking mergers make it harder for 
small businesses seeking new funding sources to establish a new lending relationship 
with consolidated banks. I empirically examine whether this is the case by estimating 
model (2). The results can be found in panel B of table 4, column 5. I find a lower 
probability of initiating a new relationship with a consolidated bank than with other 
banks (-0.8 percentage points). In column 6 to 8 I estimate the model with the variable 
Consolidated borrower interacted with three dummy variables depending on borrower 
size, age and z-score, respectively. I find an even smaller initiation rate of new 
relationships with consolidated banks for the smallest and youngest firms in the sample. 
Once more, the results support the hypothesis that the most opaque firms are more 
negatively affected by bank mergers. 
5. The effect of bank mergers on average interest rates 
In this section I examine how the average interest rate on business debt changes due to 
lenders’ merger activity, controlling for several firm characteristics, lenders’ 
characteristics and local credit market controls. I start by estimating a basic model to 
measure the overall impact of bank mergers on loan rates, and then, I analyze 
differential effects by various dimensions: target and acquirer borrowers, characteristics 
of the borrowers, characteristics of banks involved in mergers, and different market 
structures.  
                                                
15 Some robustness checks have been performed by including sector fixed effects, bank fixed effects, and 
adding some explanatory variables like length of bank firm relationship and measures of bank 
competition. Overall, the results are similar to the baseline regression. 23
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5.1. The basic model and definition of variables 
To examine the effect of mergers on the average interest rate that a firm pays on its 
debt, I estimate the following model: 
Interest Rateit = Į + ȕ Merger + Ȗ Firm characteristics t-1   
+ ș Lenders characteristics t-1 + ĳ Credit market controls t-1 
+ dt + fi + İit 
(3) 
where the dependent variable, Interest Rateit, is the average interest rate charged at time 
t by the lenders of firm i. I estimate several specifications of the above general model by 
using various variables to account for the effect of mergers. The model includes a set of 
firm characteristics, lender characteristics and some local market controls. All 
regressions include time dummies dt and firm fixed effects fi that capture unobserved 
firm heterogeneity. İit is assumed to be a zero mean, randomly distributed error term. 
The standard errors are clustered at the regional (province) level . 
Data on observable firm characteristics measured at t-1 are used to reduce the impact of 
heterogeneity of firms in our sample. Firm and credit market variables are the same as 
in section 4. The rationale for including them is the following. The logarithm of total 
assets (Log firm assets) and of sales (Log firm sales) as measures of firm size. Larger 
firms are usually more informationally transparent and this may impact loan interest 
rates. A firm's cost of credit may depend upon the liquidity and the tangibility of its 
assets. The former is proxied by the proportion of current assets over current liabilities 
(Liquidity) and the later by the proportion of fixed assets over liabilities (Collateral) 
which controls for the firm capability to pledge collateral. I use the logarithm of age 
(Log firm age) to capture the effect of firm life cycle and the fact that firms become 
more informationally transparent with age. The Number of lenders at t-1 is also 
included in the regression. I also include additional financial characteristics and balance 
sheet indicators of the firm because the banks usually take them into account when 
screening and monitoring the firm to make credit risk analysis. The ratios included are 24
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measures of firm profitability (Firm ROA) and firm liabilities scaled by total assets 
(Leverage). I additionally include the Altman Z-score as independent variable in the 
regression to capture the firm credit risk as defined in section 4.  
Bank variables are re-defined because the level of observation is a firm that may borrow 
from several banks. So, lender characteristics are the average of the variables over all 
lenders by firm at time t. The variables are bank size (Average assets of lenders) and 
bank profitability as measured by the ratio of return before taxes over assets (Average 
ROA of lenders). Finally, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is included in the 
regression as a measure of banking market concentration in the province.  
5.2. Main results 
Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) under various specifications 
for the MERGER variable. As in Sapienza (2002) I start by estimating the impact of 
mergers for continuing borrowers, that is, firms that borrow from the target and/or the 
acquiring bank the year before the merger and borrow from the consolidated bank the 
year after the merger. Later on in section 5.6 I distinguish between firms that continue 
the relationship with the merging bank and those that do not. The first model estimates 
the one-period static impact of bank mergers on borrowers interest rates. I use a dummy 
variable MERGER(t) that is equal to one if one or more of the firm lenders are involved 
in M&As in a given year t, and zero otherwise
16. The coefficient measures the 
temporary impact of a merger on interest rates. Since the model includes firm fixed 
effects, a positive (negative) value of the coefficient means that the average interest rate 
of a firm affected by a merger is larger (smaller) in the year of the merger than the 
average interest rate for that firm over all the other periods in which none of its lenders 
participates in M&A. The results in table 5 column 1 show that the average interest rate 
drops by 4.9 basis points. This suggests that when lenders are involved in merger 
activity its borrowers enjoy significantly lower interest rates in the year of the merger. 
                                                
16 For example, Banco Santander and Banco Central Hispano Americano merged in January 1999 and 
become BSCH as consolidated bank. Then, MERGER (t=1999) equal one for firms that borrow from any 
of the two institutions in 1998 and from BSCH in 1999. 25
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This supports the efficiency hypothesis that banks pass on borrowers some of the 
benefits generated in bank mergers. 
As far as the characteristics of the firm are concerned, size (measured by firm assets) 
displays the negative expected sign. Larger firms obtain cheaper external finance. Firms 
more indebted and with higher growth opportunities (measured by firm sales) have 
higher cost of capital. Age has a positive effect on cost of capital. Profitability, liquidity 
and the availability of collateral have a positive effect on cost of capital. Surprisingly, 
the Z-score variable that controls for firm creditworthiness has a positive sign; it does 
not confirm Rajan's (1992) theoretical prediction that firms with a higher probability of 
failure should suffer more from informational hold-up problems. The larger the number 
of lenders the larger the average interest rate on loans. 
The regression also controls for bank characteristics. The most significant effect is for 
bank profitability. I find that larger and more profitable lenders charge lower interest 
rates on loans. Finally, the coefficient for HHI is positive but non-significant, showing 
that greater banking market concentration tends to increase interest rates but the 
relationship is not strong. 
5.3. Temporary and permanent effects 
Although the estimated coefficient for the MERGER(t) variable in this model is 
significant, this specification only accounts for a temporary reduction of interest rates in 
the year of the merger. In order to test whether the effect on interest rates is permanent, 
I use a dummy variable MERGER(t,T) equal one in all years after one of the firm 
lenders is involved in M&As, and zero otherwise
17. If there is more than one lender 
involved in M&A, this variable takes value one after the first merger in the sample 
period. Since the model includes firm fixed effects, this specification compares the 
average interest rate of a firm before and after one of its lenders participates in M&A. 
The results in column 2 show that the average interest rate is 10.6 basis points lower in 
subsequent years after a bank merger. 
                                                
17 Following the previous example, MERGER (t,T) equal one from 1999 to 2005 for firms that borrow 
from any of the two institutions in 1998 and from BSCH in 1999. 26
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To further disentangle the temporary and permanent effects, I estimate a model with the 
dummy variable MERGER(t) and a new dummy variable MERGER(t+1,T) that is equal 
to one in all years after one of the firm’s lenders is involved in M&As except for the 
year of the merger itself. If the firm’s lenders are involved in M&A in different years, 
this variable equals zero for all the years that a merger occurs. In this specification, 
MERGER(t) captures the short run effect and MERGER(t+1,T) captures the long run 
effect of bank mergers on interest rates. The results reported in column 3 show that 
there are significant short run and long run effects of mergers on interest rates of -10.9 
and -9.7 basis points respectively (the average interest rate is 3.50 percent). However, 
the difference between the short run and long run effect is not statistically different from 
zero (F(1,51)=1.49, p-value=0.2284). Therefore, the preferred specification is column 2. 
This suggests that the reduction in interest rates is permanent.  
 
In sum, the main result presented in this section is that interest rates decline after a bank 
merger, which is consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. The following sections focus 
on estimating the heterogeneous effects of mergers on borrowers of acquirer and target 




5.4. Target versus acquirer borrowers 
 
Most studies find that prior to the merger targets perform poorly compared to acquirers 
(Amel et al. 2004). The descriptive evidence provided in table 2 also points in that 
direction. Therefore, efficiency gains are expected to be larger for target banks than for 
acquirers.  A main contribution of this paper is to estimate differential effects between 
target and acquirer borrowers. If the main motivation for banks to merge is to increase 
efficiency (for instance, by replacing poorly performing target bank management), one 
should expect larger interest rate cuts for the target borrowers than for the acquirer 
borrowers. To test this hypothesis we define a dummy variable TARGET(t,T) that is 
equal to one in all years after one of the firm lenders is a target bank in a merger, and 
zero otherwise. ACQUIRER(t,T) is defined analogously for borrowers of acquirer 
banks. In the case that a firm borrows from a target and an acquirer (for the same or a 27
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different merger), then both variables are equal to one. The results are reported in 
column 4 of table 5. As expected, borrowers from target banks experience a larger 
reduction on interest rates (19.8 basis points) than borrowers of acquiring banks (9 basis 
points), the difference being statistically significant different from zero (F(1,51)=7.27, p-




The next specification accounts for differential short and long run effects for target and 
acquirer borrowers. The results in column 5 show that borrowers of target (acquirer) 
banks experience a reduction of interest rates of 14.6 (9.2) basis points in the short run 
and of 22.4 (8.2) basis points in the long run. For acquirer borrowers, the short and long 
run effects are statistically equal (F(1,51)=0.96, p-value=0.3326). Interestingly, for target 
borrowers the long run effect is larger than the short run effect (F(1,51)=14.15, p-
value=0.0004). That is, borrowers of the usually more inefficient target bank obtain 
some efficiency gains in the short run and are further benefited from the bank merger by 
having access to a more efficient and larger bank because of the merger. This evidence 
is consistent with the fact that some time is needed for the restructuring process after a 
merger, so that the benefits of mergers are fully passed on to target borrowers one year 
after the merger. Sapienza (2002) finds that for Italian consolidated banks it takes about 
four to six months to revise loan interest rates. 
 
So far, I interpreted the reduction on interest rates as merger efficiency gains. An 
alternative explanation for this finding is that continuing target borrowers have higher 
quality than acquiring borrowers. The consolidated bank reduces interest rates to the 
highest quality borrowers when the new borrower pool is added in its portfolio. This 
hypothesis may seem plausible in light of the results presented in the first part of the 
analysis. Smaller and younger borrowers of target banks are more likely to terminate 
their relationship with the target bank than large borrowers. The larger interest rate drop 
                                                 
18 The model is re-estimated by restricting the sample to firms that experience just one merger event 
during the sample period plus a control group of firms that are not affected by any merger. Although one 
may introduce sample selection by applying this criteria (for instance, smaller firms are likely to 
experience a smaller number of mergers due to their restricted scope on the number of lenders), the model 
is estimated with this restricted sample to avoid composition of effects. That is, the identification of 
effects due to the current merger with respect to the lagged effects of a previous merger are blurred. In 
this subsample the variables TARGET(t,T) and ACQUIRER(t,T) are never simultaneously equal to one. 
Although the number of observations is reduced by sixty percent, the results are qualitatively similar 
(target: -20.4 basis points, acquirer -5.8 basis points).  28
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for continuing target borrowers may be driven by a selection bias in which acquiring 
banks simply identify good borrowers of poorly performing target banks. In section 
5.10 I show that the results remain qualitatively the same once we control for selection.  
5.5. Overlap borrowers  
There is a particularly interesting group of firms that have a lending relationship with 
both the target and the acquiring bank before a merger and continue the lending 
relationship with the consolidated bank after that merger. These “overlap” borrowers 
drop one lending relationship as a consequence of the merger. In this section I explore 
the effect of bank mergers for “overlap” borrowers. On the one hand, one should expect 
that overlap borrowers would be adversely affected by mergers because of the loss of 
one lending relationship which may imply a loss of bank-firm specific information and 
a reduction of bargaining power vis-à-vis lenders. This effect should be particularly 
important for firms facing high switching costs. On the other hand, overlap borrowers 
receive efficiency gains generated by the merger and may benefit from the combination 
of information of the two lending institutions into one.  
To examine the differential effects for overlap mergers, I define a new dummy variable 
OVERLAP(t,T) equal to one in all years after a firm borrows from both target and 
acquirer in a given merger. Additionally, the variables TARGET(t,T) and 
ACQUIRER(t,T) are re-defined to be equal to one in all years after one of the firm’s 
lenders is a target (acquirer) bank in a merger and no other lender is the acquirer (target) 
for that merger, and zero otherwise. The results are presented in column 6. Overlap 
borrowers experience the highest reduction in interest rates (22.3 basis points), 
compared to 17.9 of target borrowers and 8.0 of acquirer borrowers. This result would 
suggest that overlap borrowers are not harmed by the loss of one lending relationship. 
The difference between overlap and target borrowers is not statistically different from 
zero (F(1,51)=1.10, p-value=0.3002), suggesting that the effect of mergers for overlap 
borrowers is similar to that of target borrowers. This finding is consistent with the 
results obtained by Bonaccorsi and Patti (2007) of no significant change on credit 
availability for overlap borrowers compared to target borrowers. 29
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I estimate the model with a restricted sample by eliminating those firms that initiate a 
new lending relationship with a consolidated bank in the year of the merger (column 7, 
table 5).
19 Excluding new borrowers controls for potential biases due to changes in the 
composition of the pool of firms borrowing from the consolidating bank. The estimated 
results show that the average reduction in interest rate is even larger for all firms: target, 
acquirer and overlap borrowers.   
5.6. Continuing, terminating and switching lending relationships 
When a lending bank participates in a merger, its borrowers face a change in their 
funding sources and are subject to the new lending policy of the consolidated bank. As a 
consequence, lending relationships with the consolidated bank may continue or may be 
terminated, and new lending relationships may be initiated. These changes in lending 
relationships may reflect either a bank’s decision or a firm’s choice. In the analysis on 
interest rates presented so far, I considered the impact of mergers to continuing 
borrowers, that is, firms that borrow from the target and/or the acquiring bank the year 
before the merger and borrow from the consolidated bank the year after the merger. In 
this section I estimate differential effects for continuing borrowers and those that 
terminate the relationship with the consolidated bank in the year of the merger. 
Following Degryse et al. (2006), I also differentiate between relationship 
discontinuations that are simultaneously replaced by a new lending relationship started 
in that same year (switch) from pure relationship discontinuations, that is, firms that 
terminate the relationship with the merging bank and do not add new lending 
relationships (no switch). The distinction between firms that switch banks and firms that 
do not is particularly relevant for overlap borrowers because they experience a drop of 
one lending relationship as a result of the merger. It is expected that overlap borrowers 
would be more inclined to establish a new lending relationship following a merger than 
borrowers of only one merging bank.  
Before looking at the results, it is important to highlight that decisions regarding lending 
relationships are made simultaneously with the determination of loan terms. For 
                                                
19 The number of firms dropped is 12,010 and the number of firms included in the regression is 112,203. 30
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instance, consider a target borrower that would experience an increase in interest rate 
when renewing the loan with the new consolidated bank. Instead of accepting 
unfavorable loan rates in the consolidated bank, it may seek funding at better terms 
from an existing relationship or switch to a new bank. In that case, borrowers that 
discontinue the relationship would pay lower interest rates than continuing borrowers. 
That is, the average interest rate that the firm pays would be endogenously determined 
with the termination and switching decision. The results in this section should be 
interpreted with this limitation in mind.  
For comparability of results, in the first column of table 6 I reproduce the results of the 
model that estimates differential effects for overlap, target, and acquirer continuing 
borrowers. In column 2 I estimate a model with differential effects for target, acquirer 
and overlap borrowers that continue or terminate the relationship with the consolidated 
bank
20. The variable “Target & Terminate” is a dummy variable equal one in all years 
after a firm that borrows from a target borrower terminates the relationship with the 
consolidated bank. The remaining variables are defined accordingly. The coefficients 
for continuing firms are fairly similar to those in column 1. Controlling for borrowers 
that terminate the relationship does not alter the sign or the magnitude of the main 
results. For discontinuing borrowers, the impact on interest rates is much smaller and 
only the coefficient for target banks is significantly different from zero. These results 
reinforce the interpretation of efficiency gains in mergers that are passed on to 
continuing borrowers. Firms that discontinue the lending relationship with the 
consolidated bank pay interest rates similar to non-merging banks borrowers. The 
significant reduction of interest rates for target borrowers that terminate the lending 
relationship is consistent with the interpretation that target banks are usually more 
inefficient and hence the loss of this lending relationship indeed benefits its borrowers. 
In order to further check the significance of this result, in the third column I estimate the 
same model by eliminating from the sample firms that initiate a new lending 
relationship with a consolidated bank in the year of the merger. As explained before, the 
inclusion of new borrowers of consolidated banks may bias the results because, for 
instance, the new consolidated bank may follow a lending policy of flight to quality. 
The estimated results show that the effect on interest rates for continuing borrowers is 
                                                
20 Overlap borrowers that terminate the relationship with the consolidated bank experience a drop of two 
lending relationships. 31
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now stronger while for discontinuing borrowers it is not significantly different from 
zero, even for target borrowers.  
Next, I estimate differential effects for discontinuing borrowers depending on whether 
they start a new lending relationship or not. The results can be found in column 4. The 
variable “Target & Terminate & Switch” is a dummy variable equal one in all years 
after a firm is a target borrower, terminates the relationship with the consolidated bank 
and starts a new lending relationship in the year of the merger. The coefficients for 
continuing firms are fairly similar to those obtained so far. For discontinuing borrowers, 
the only significant coefficient is for “Target & Terminate & No Switch” borrowers. 
This result is consistent with the fact that firms with high switching costs that are 
dropped from the consolidated bank may prefer to increase the borrowed amount from 
previously existing lending relationships instead of starting a new lending relationship. I 
cannot test whether this is indeed the case because of lack of disaggregated data on 
amount borrowed from each lender. Nevertheless, the reduction of interest rates for 
these borrowers is smaller than the reduction enjoyed by target continuing borrowers. 
The results show that terminating the lending relationship with the consolidated bank 
prevents firms from receiving benefits of more efficient consolidated banks. Assuming 
firms choose their lenders optimally, this finding indicates that termination of 
relationships is most likely a bank’s decision. Otherwise, firms would choose to borrow 
from more efficient banks granting lower interest rate loans.  As before, I estimate the 
same model by eliminating from the sample firms that initiate a new lending 
relationship with a consolidated bank in the year of the merger. The estimated results in 
column 5 show that the effect on interest rates for continuing borrowers is somewhat 
stronger while for discontinuing borrowers it is not significantly different from zero.  
The distinction between firms that switch banks and firms that do not is particularly 
relevant for overlap borrowers because they experience an exogenous reduction of one 
lending relationship as a result of the merger. It is expected that overlap borrowers 
would be more inclined to establish a new lending relationship following a merger than 
borrowers of only one merging bank. In column 6, overlap continuing borrowers are 
separated into two groups. “Overlap & Continue & Switch” is a dummy variable equal 
one in all years after a firm is an overlap borrower, continues the relationship with the 
consolidated bank and starts a new lending relationship in the year of the merger. 32
ECB
Working Paper Series No 934
September 2008
“Overlap & Continue & No Switch” is a dummy variable equal one in all years after a 
firm is an overlap borrower, continues the relationship with the consolidated bank and 
does not starts any lending relationships in the year of the merger. This specification 
tests for the importance for overlap borrowers to replace the lost lending relationship. 
The coefficients estimated show that overlap borrowers experience a reduction in 
interest rates regardless of whether they are able to replace the lost lending relationship 
or not. We cannot reject the null of equality of coefficients (F(1,51)=0.01,  p-
value=0.941). In the last column I estimate the model by including dummies of 
relationship termination and further dividing overlap borrowers that terminate the 
lending relationship with the consolidated bank between switching and non-switching 
firms. The estimated results are consistent with those discussed above. 
 
In sum, the results presented so far show that interest rates decline after a bank merger, 
which is consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. The decline is permanent and larger 
for acquirer borrowers. Overlap borrowers show effects similar to target borrowers. 
Firms terminating the relationship with the consolidated bank have effects  similar to 
non-merging bank borrowers, and hence are included in the control group. In the 
remainder of the paper, I report the models corresponding to permanent effects using the 
variables TARGET(t,T) and ACQUIRER(t,T). The regressions with temporary effects, 
overlap borrowers, and dummies for terminating borrowers are always estimated; the 
results are discussed only when they differ from those reported in tables. The following 
sections focus on estimating the heterogeneous impact of mergers by borrower’s 
characteristics and type of merger. 
 
 
5.7. Borrower size and age 
 
The impact of mergers can be stronger for firms facing more acute informational 
asymmetries and high switching costs. In this section I investigate whether bank 
mergers have heterogeneous effects depending on some borrower characteristics that 
proxy for their opaqueness. First, borrowers are classified by size in three categories: 
micro, small and medium firms in the year of entering the sample. The model is 
estimated for each size subsample. Second, I select the youngest firms in the sample 
(firms that when entering the sample are less than five years old) and estimate the model 33
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for young firms by size category. The results are presented table 7. The first column 
reproduces the results for the whole sample to facilitate comparability. Columns 2 to 4 
show that there are not significant differences in the reduction of interest rates for 
acquirer and target borrowers by firm size. Furthermore, for the smallest firms in the 
sample (micro and small) the decline in interest rates appears to be even more severe 
than for medium firms. Columns 5 to 7 further restrict the sample to young firms. The 
same pattern of results shows up: young and micro firms affected by bank merger 
activity experience the highest reduction in interest rates, followed by young and small 
firms; medium firms do not appear to gain as much as the smallest and youngest firms, 
however, the effect on interest rates is still negative (although less significant). In sum, 
the evidence presented here does not support the hypothesis that mergers 
disproportionally harm the most informationally opaque firms; on the contrary, the 
smallest and youngest firms in the sample appear to be the ones receiving more gains 
from mergers.  
5.8. Bank size and ownership form 
There is an ongoing discussion on the effects of bank size to small business lending. 
Several authors argue that large banks created through mergers may not be responsive 
to the needs of small businesses (Peek and Rosengren 1998, Berger et al. 1998, Strahan 
and Weston 1998, Berger et al. 2007). The reason is that large banks may have a 
disadvantage in lending to small and opaque businesses. For instance, Stein (2002) 
argues that large banks face organizational diseconomies and hence are at a 
disadvantage to use and transmit soft information, which is crucial for value enhancing 
lending relationships.  
In this section I explore which types of consolidation produce the largest changes in 
loan interest rates. Following Delgado et al. (2007), banks are grouped into three size 
classes: small (€1000 million in total loans or less), medium (between €1000 and 25,000 
million) and large (above €25,000 million). Mergers are classified into six categories 
according to the size of banks. The smaller bank is the target in all mergers. 34
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The findings are shown in panel A, table 8. Two interesting patterns arise. First, the 
most beneficial mergers from the borrower point of view are those involving two large 
banks. On average, target (acquirer) borrowers experience a reduction on interest rate of 
27.6 (11) basis points. This result is quantitatively relevant because it has the potential 
to affect the largest number of borrowers given the size of the banks involved. Second, 
borrowers seem to also benefit when banks of different size merge. For instance, 
borrowers of a small target bank that is acquired by a large bank experience a reduction 
on interest rate of 23.8 basis points. This suggests that mergers of equals do not seem to 
benefit its borrowers as much as mergers of banks of different size, except for mergers 
involving two large banks. The findings in this section differ from Sapienza (2002) who 
finds larger declines on interest rates for borrowers of smaller target banks. However, 
they are consistent with Erel (2006) that documents favorable effects of large banks’ 
mergers on small business.  
 
As pointed out in section 2, Spanish banks differ on their form of ownership and 
governance structure. Out of the 40 mergers occurred in the sample period, 24 involved 
two commercial banks, 4 mergers occurred between two savings banks, in 8 mergers a 
savings bank acquired a commercial bank, and 4 involved one official credit institution. 
In this section I explore the heterogeneous impact that different ownership of merging 
banks may have on its borrowers. One would expect that clearer and well-defined 
property rights should imply higher economic performance and efficiency of 
commercial banks with respect to savings banks. However, the empirical evidence in 
the Spanish banking market suggests that savings and commercial banks have similar 
levels of productive efficiency (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell 1997, Lozano 1998). As Crespí  
et al. (2004) points out, product-market competition and the possibility of being 
acquired by another savings bank have served as a disciplinary effect for savings banks. 
Delgado et al. (2007) finds that savings banks specialize relatively more in relationship 
loans.  
 
The results can be found in panel B. Some interesting patterns show up. The largest 
reduction in interest rates is 21 basis points for target borrowers when two commercial 
banks merge. When a savings bank acquires another bank (commercial or savings 
bank), only acquiring borrowers experience a significant reduction in interest rates; 
target borrowers do not. For mergers involving at least one official credit entity both 35
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target and acquirer experience a similar decline in interest rates of about 12-14 basis 
points. Although some coefficients are not significant, all of them are negative, 
reinforcing the interpretation that mergers entail efficiency gains. 
 
Finally, I combine the two dimensions of size and ownership form of merging banks. 
That is, mergers are classified in twelve categories depending on ownership and size of 
merging banks. Note that all mergers involving two savings banks correspond to a 
medium bank acquiring a small bank. This analysis may give insights as to which types 
of consolidation are more likely to produce the largest changes in interest rates. The 
results can be found in panel C. The largest reductions in interest rates correspond to 
small target borrowers of commercial banks that are acquired by a large commercial 
banks (32 basis points). This type of merger produces large efficiency gains for target 
borrowers that continue the relationship with the consolidated bank. Borrowers of target 
small commercial banks and acquiring medium savings banks also experience 
significant reductions in interest rates.  
 
 
5.9. In-market mergers, out-of-market mergers and market concentration 
 
The results obtained so far indicate that bank mergers generate some gains which are 
passed on to borrowers in the form of reduced loan interest rates. Bank mergers enhance 
cost efficiency because the new consolidated bank may reduce costs, for example, by 
eliminating redundant managerial positions or closing bank branches serving the same 
local market. The potential for cutting costs is greater the larger the geographic overlap 
of merging banks. At the same time, mergers among banks with large market overlap 
may entail a significant increase in the local banking market concentration. Higher 
market power of the new consolidated bank may offset the cost saving effect from the 
borrower’s point of view. Therefore, which of the two effects dominates is an empirical 
question. Mergers among banks with no market overlap do not raise concerns for 
increased market power and may increase efficiency of the consolidated institution by 
means of greater risk diversification and economies of scope. 
 
In this section I examine the relation between loan interest rates and the degree of 
geographical market overlap between the target and the acquiring banks. First, I 36
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distinguish between in-market and out-of-market mergers. Second, I differentiate 
between provinces with a significant increase in banking market concentration and 
those without significant changes. Finally I combine the two dimensions to obtain some 
insights on whether merging banks with high market overlap may create some concerns 
for market power.  
A province is affected by an in-market merger if at least two banks involved in a given 
merger were operating in that province when the merger occurred. A province is 
affected by an out-of-market merger if a bank with branches in a province is taken over 
by an acquirer that did not operate in that province prior to the merger. This is the same 
definition as in Sapienza (2002). For a given merger and given the geographical 
distribution of target and acquiring bank branches, some provinces are classified as in-
market merger, some provinces as out-of-market, and some other provinces are neither 
in-market nor out-of-market. In my merger sample, out of the 1,224 province-merger 
observations there are 484 in-market observations and 87 out-of-market observations. 
The remaining observations are provinces affected by the merger that do not satisfy the 
definition for in-market or out-of-market province. For instance, a bank with branches 
in a province takes over an acquirer that did not operate in that province prior to the 
merger. 
The results can be found in table 9. In panel A I estimate differential effects for target 
and acquirer borrowers for in-market, out-of-market and other bank mergers. For in-
market mergers, we observe that target borrowers experience a large decrease in interest 
rates of 20.7 basis points, which confirms the hypothesis that mergers entail larger cost 
efficiency gains the greater the market overlap. As I argued before, target borrowers are 
more likely to benefit from efficiency gains because target banks are usually much more 
inefficient that acquirer banks. Acquiring borrowers do not benefit as much from in-
market mergers because they already had a lending relationship with a quite efficient 
financial institution. From out-of-market mergers the reverse pattern arises: acquirer 
borrowers experience a larger decrease on interest rates than target borrowers. Merger 
gains when there is no market overlap basically arise from greater risk diversification. 
Acquirer borrowers seem to benefit the most from improved risk management practices. 37
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Next, I divide mergers depending on the increase in the degree of concentration in the 
provincial banking market as measured by the provincial HHI. I use three cut points for 
the increase in HHI: 50, 100 and 200. For instance, one group contains provinces in 
which the HHI increases by more than 100 points (113 province-merger observations) 
and the second groups contains the remaining provinces (1,111 province-merger 
observations). The results can be found in panels B.1 to B.3. We observe a significant 
market power effect. The larger the increase in banking market concentration the lower 
the decline in interest rates. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even for the provinces 
with the highest increase in HHI (panel B.3) the estimated effects are still negative for 
target borrowers and only marginally positive for acquirer borrowers (none of these 
effects are statistically different from zero). In light of these results, we can conclude 
that increases in market power determine the extent to which banks share efficiency 
gains with its borrowers. I do not find support for the hypothesis that market power may 
dominate efficiency gains as is the case in Italy (Sapienza 2002) and the U.S. (Erel 
2005). None of the regression estimates shows a positive effect of mergers on interest 
rates, suggesting that market power effects have not been a concern in Spanish banking 
market. 
 
To further check this conclusion, I divide in-market mergers in two groups: provinces in 
which the HHI increases by more than 100 points (113 province-merger observations) 
and the rest (371 province-merger observations). The results in panel C confirm the 
previous results that in-market mergers generate efficiency gains for target borrowers. 
The effect is smaller for mergers that increase the concentration in the local banking 
market. Still, the effect is negative and significant. Acquirer borrowers benefit the most 
from out-of-market mergers. I confirm that efficiency gains from mergers prevail over 
the market power effects, so that borrowers benefit from banking consolidation. 
5.10. Does selection explain the reduction in interest rates? 
 
The interest rate reduction for continuing borrowers could reflect a selection mechanism 
according to which only the higher quality firms (or firms with certain characteristics) 
continue the lending relationship with the consolidated bank. When the new borrower 
pool is added in its portfolio, the consolidated bank reduces interest rates to these high 38
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quality borrowers. In this section I perform a selection test and then I estimate the 
model correcting for this bias.
21  
In order to test for selection bias, one can look for pre-existing effects of the mergers. I 
re-estimate the original model with the MERGER(t) variable but also include the lead of 
this dummy MERGER(t+1) that is equal to one if one or more of the firm lenders are 
involved in M&As in the following year t+1. In the presence of selection, the lead 
variable would be significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis of no effect of 
merger on interest rates is rejected only if the coefficient on MERGER(t) is significant 
and the coefficient on the pre-merger dummy MERGER(t+1) is either insignificant or 
opposite signed. The coefficient of MERGER(t) is -0.049 (significant at 1%) and the 
coefficient of MERGER(t+1) is -0.004 (not significantly different from zero). This 
diagnostic test is consistent with no selection bias. Next, I estimate a two-stage model to 
correct for selection. In the first stage, I estimate a probit model for each t on the 
probability that a firm lender is involved in a merger, i.e. the dependent variable is 
MERGER(t). The inverse Mills ratio of each regression is interacted with time dummies 
and is included in the main regression to control for selection bias. The coefficient of 
the MERGER(t) variable is slightly decreased to -0.040 (compared to -0.049 without 
correction) and remains highly significant. To estimate long term effects, we use the 
variable MERGER(t,T). The coefficient estimated is -0.090 (compared to -0.106 
without correction). Overall, the results with correction for selection bias are consistent 
with those without correction. The interest rate drop for borrowers of consolidated 
banks does not appear to be driven by a selection bias in which acquiring banks simply 
identify good borrowers of poorly performing target banks.  
6. Conclusion and implications for European banking market integration 
This paper provides evidence on the costs and benefits of bank mergers to small 
business. On the one hand, mergers are harmful to small businesses because lending 
relationships are more likely to be disrupted following a merger. Small borrowers of 
target banks have a higher probability of losing a relationship with the consolidated 
                                                
21 The main results are reported in the text. The results of these regressions are available from the author 
upon request. 39
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bank. Moreover, small borrowers find it harder to start new lending relationship with 
consolidated banks. In sum, the higher termination rate for existing borrowers is not 
compensated with a higher initiation rate of new lending relationships with small 
businesses after the merger.  
On the other hand, continuing borrowers benefit from mergers in terms of reduced loan 
rates. Small and young firms enjoy the highest decline in interest rates. The most 
beneficial mergers from the borrower point of view are those involving two large banks, 
which is not consistent with the existence of a “size effect” in lending. While the 
reduction in interest rates is larger when the acquirer and the target have some market 
overlap and, consequently, more potential for cost savings, the decline is much smaller 
when there is a significant increase in local banking market concentration. That is, the 
change in local market concentration determines the extent to which efficiency gains are 
passed on to borrowers. From a policy perspective, this result hints at a potential 
concern if banking consolidation keeps up the same pace. The degree of banking 
concentration in some Spanish provinces is currently quite high, the majority of banks 
have a presence in almost all Spanish provinces, and thus there is little room for 
additional out-of-market mergers within Spain. One may expect that if more in-market 
bank mergers occur the sign of the effect of mergers on interest rates may reverse.  
Even though this study only uses Spanish data and focuses on within-country mergers, 
some implications can be derived for the integration of the European banking market. In 
particular, the analysis of in-market versus out-of-market mergers can be viewed as a 
control environment to compare the effects of domestic mergers versus cross-country 
mergers where the institutional and regulatory variables are held constant.  
The predictions of the effects of domestic mergers (within borders) on small business 
depend on the degree of concentration of each country’s banking market. In the 90s, 
many European countries experienced a wave of domestic M&A. This consolidation 
process has clearly led to an increased banking concentration within individual 
European countries. Domestic consolidation was based on the conviction that a strong 
domestic market is necessary before moving abroad and on the policy of creating 
“national champions” (Group of Ten 2001, Boot 1999, Carbó et al. 2007). As a result, 
the scale and market share of banks increased within borders. In light of the results 40
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presented in the paper, one should expect only small benefits of domestic M&A for 
small businesses.  
 
After peaking in 1999, the value of European domestic banking deals has been in 
decline. Interestingly, since 2003 the value of European cross-border deals has been 
rising year after year. There are a number of reasons to believe that cross-border 
banking consolidation will increase in Europe during the coming years. The larger 
players in some countries are unlikely to grow through further domestic M&A because 
their markets have become increasingly concentrated. For some time now, the European 
Commission has focused on the removal of impediments to European cross-border 
banking consolidation. The enlargement of the European Union is expected to increase 
the level of cross-border M&A activity involving banks with an appetite for exposure to 
higher growth markets. Indeed, approximately one-third of the number of bank M&A 
deals in Europe over the last ten years has involved banks in western Europe acquiring 
all or part of banks in emerging Europe (central and eastern Europe, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, the Baltic States and Turkey) (Pricewaterhouse 2006). The 
results in the paper show that out-of-market mergers generate some efficiency gains, 
probably in terms of greater risk diversification, which are passed along to borrowers. In 
light of this analysis, one should expect that small businesses will benefit from 
increased cross-border M&A. 
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Panel A. Target bank
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total assets 40 6.30 16.29 0.06 75.88
ROA 37 0.01 3.56 -17.70 6.77
Capital/Assets 35 7.15 13.52 0.47 68.57
Panel B. Acquirer bank
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total assets 32 27.76 39.25 0.33 175.43
ROA 31 0.89 0.48 -0.22 1.97
Capital/Assets 21 2.97 4.10 0.34 16.56
Panel C. Consolidated bank
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total assets 32 37.48 53.16 0.02 193.57
ROA 30 1.05 1.13 0.07 6.77
Capital/Assets 21 2.94 3.41 0.34 11.44
Total assets are expressed in constant 2000 euros (thousand milions).
ROA is EBIT over assets. Capital is subscribed capital over assets.
Target and acquirer bank observations refer to the year before the
merger and consolidated bank to the year after the merger.46
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Panel A. All firms and continuing borrowers
All firms  Target borrowers Acquirer borrowers  Overlap borrowers
Number of firm-year observations (N=674735)  (N=26679) (N=155855)  (N=4305)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Firm age  13.0 11.0 15.3 13.0 13.9 12.0 19.0 16.0
Assets (1000) 3822 1209 5573 2075 4497 1401 8213 4695
Sales (1000) 4475 1816 6685 2944 5303 2067 10181 6138
Number of lenders 1.98 2.00 3.10 3.00 2.50 2.00 4.69 4.00
Z-score 3.44 3.17 3.30 3.04 3.42 3.16 3.15 2.93
Leverage 70.15 73.75 69.49 72.93 69.07 72.49 66.91 70.00
Liquidity 1.49 1.18 1.47 1.18 1.51 1.20 1.49 1.22
Collateral 0.41 0.24 0.40 0.25 0.40 0.23 0.41 0.26
Firm ROA  6.95 5.96 7.44 6.45 7.20 6.17 7.30 6.43
Panel B. Initiation & termination of lending relationship with consolidated bank
New borrowers  Target & terminate Aquirer & terminate Overlap & terminate











Leverage is the ratio of liabilities over assets.
EBIT over assets. Altman Z-score is ZA = 1.2
.
Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Firm age  16.2 14.0 19.0 16.0 19.2
Assets (1000) 6870 3210 8417 3866 9534
Sales (1000) 8096 4609 9321 5167 10673
Number of lenders 2.71 2.00 3.75 3.00 3.90
Z-score 3.16 2.91 3.12 2.89 3.07
Leverage 69.66 73.08 66.29 69.22 68.02
Liquidity 1.42 1.17 1.53 1.24 1.46
Collateral 0.39 0.26 0.39 0.25 0.41
Firm ROA  7.04 6.07 6.31 5.48 6.21
Age is the number of years since firm was founded. Assets and assets are at constant 2000 euros (in thousands).
Liquidity is the ratio of current assets over current liabilities. Collateral is fixed assets over assets. Firm ROA is
[working capital/assets] + 1.4 [retained earnings/assets] + 3.3 [EBIT/assets] + 0.6 [equity /liabilities] + 1 [sales/assets]47
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Table 4
Termination and initiation of lending relationships by firm characteristics
PANEL A. Terminate relationship PANEL B. Inititate relationship
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Target 0.018***
[0.001]
Target & D1 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.018***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
Target & D2 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.017***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]




Acquirer & D1 -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Acquirer & D2 -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]




Consolidated & D1 -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.006***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Consolidated & D2 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Consolidated & D3 -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.011***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Log firm age  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log firm assets 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log firm sales  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Leverage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Liquidity -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Collateral 0 0 0 0 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
F i r m  R O A   0000 0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of lenders 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log lender assets -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lender ROA -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.275*** -0.276*** -0.274*** -0.275***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Medium lender (0,1) -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Large lender (0,1) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 1142521 1142521 1142521 1142521 1142521 1142521 1142521 1142521
Chi2 test tar1=tar3 39.24 4.889 2.813
p-value 0.000 0.027 0.094
Probit estimates. Marginal effects on the probability of discontinuing the lending relationship evaluated at the sample
mean of the explanatory variables. The dependent variable in Panel A is Terminate relationship that equals one in
year t if firm i does not report having a relationship with bank k in year t+1. In Panel B the dependent variable Initiate
relationship equals one in year t if firm i did not report having a relationship with bank k in year t-1. In columns 2-4 the
model is estimated with the variables Target borrower, Acquirer borrower and Consolidated borrower interacted with
three dummy variables (D1, D2, D3) defined according to firm characteristics. Column 2-borrower size (micro, small,
medium), 3-firm age, 4-zscore. In Panel A, the last two rows present the Chi2 test for the equality of Target*D1 and
Target*D3. The regressions also include 9 year dummies and 51 province dummies. Robust standard errors in48
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Table 5
Temporary and permanent effects of lender mergers on interest rates
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]






Target (t,T) -0.198*** -0.179*** -0.195***
[0.035] [0.034] [0.035]











Overlap (t,T) -0.223*** -0.270***
[0.030] [0.058]
Number of lenders 0.015** 0.014** 0.014** 0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.002
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009]
Average assets of lenders  -0.727** -0.376 -0.424 -0.05 0.084 -0.073 -0.054
[0.351] [0.310] [0.330] [0.274] [0.290] [0.271] [0.328]
Average ROA of lenders  -4.700*** -3.967** -4.101** -2.687* -2.214 -2.646* -2.17
[1.720] [1.699] [1.734] [1.533] [1.552] [1.525] [1.494]
HHI in province  1.17 1.288 1.267 1.393 1.426 1.375 1.258
[1.165] [1.168] [1.174] [1.176] [1.181] [1.174] [1.277]
Log firm age  0.127*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.101***
[0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]
Log firm assets -0.413*** -0.413*** -0.413*** -0.414*** -0.414*** -0.414*** -0.414***
[0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.050]
Log firm sales  0.039** 0.039** 0.039** 0.040** 0.040** 0.040** 0.045**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020]
Z-score 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Leverage 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Liquidity 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.130***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Collateral 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.284***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.030]
Firm ROA  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18
Observations 674735 674735 674735 674735 674735 674735 577351
Number of firms 124213 124213 124213 124213 124213 124213 112203
The dependent variable is the average interest rate paid by firm i at time t. The regression is estimated with 
firm fixed effects. The regression also includes 9 year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the province 
level in brackets.49
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Table 6
Continuing, terminating and switching lending relationships
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Target & Continue -0.179*** -0.177*** -0.195*** -0.177*** -0.195*** -0.179*** -0.177***
[0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034]
Acquirer & Continue -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.102*** -0.079*** -0.102*** -0.080*** -0.079***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Overlap & Continue -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.270*** -0.224*** -0.272***
[0.030] [0.030] [0.058] [0.030] [0.057]
Target & Terminate -0.084** -0.074 -0.083**
[0.040] [0.056] [0.040]
Acquirer & Terminate -0.067 -0.017 -0.067
[0.041] [0.045] [0.040]
Overlap & Terminate -0.128 0.210
[0.225] [0.199]
Target & Terminate & Switch -0.05 -0.062
[0.068] [0.088]
Acquirer & Terminate & Switch -0.045 0.056
[0.034] [0.045]
Overlap & Terminate & Switch -0.088 0.132 0.000
[0.254] [0.321] [0.000]
Target & Terminate & No Switch -0.112** -0.085
[0.055] [0.059]
Acquirer & Terminate & No Switch -0.093 -0.103
[0.064] [0.076]
Overlap & Terminate & No Switch -0.208 0.279 0.000
[0.271] [0.264] [0.000]
Overlap & Continue & Switch -0.218** -0.210**
[0.094] [0.094]
Overlap & Continue & No Switch -0.227*** -0.227***
[0.037] [0.037]
Number of lenders 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.000 -0.003
[0.006] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.010] [0.006] [0.007]
Average assets of lenders  -0.073 -0.082 -0.053 -0.08 -0.051 -0.073 -0.081
[0.271] [0.271] [0.329] [0.270] [0.329] [0.269] [0.268]
Average ROA of lenders  -2.646* -2.628* -2.158 -2.633* -2.163 -2.633* -2.617*
[1.525] [1.522] [1.490] [1.525] [1.486] [1.521] [1.519]
HHI in province  1.375 1.379 1.253 1.377 1.256 1.374 1.378
[1.174] [1.176] [1.278] [1.176] [1.277] [1.174] [1.176]
Log firm age  0.112*** 0.110*** 0.100*** 0.110*** 0.100*** 0.112*** 0.110***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Log firm assets -0.414*** -0.413*** -0.414*** -0.413*** -0.414*** -0.414*** -0.413***
[0.049] [0.049] [0.050] [0.049] [0.050] [0.049] [0.049]
Log firm sales  0.040** 0.040** 0.045** 0.040** 0.045** 0.040** 0.040**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
Z-score 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Leverage 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Liquidity 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.128***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Collateral 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.284*** 0.289*** 0.284*** 0.289*** 0.289***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.030] [0.025] [0.030] [0.025] [0.025]
Firm ROA  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19
Observations 674735 674735 577351 674735 577351 674735 674735
Number of firms 124213 124213 112203 124213 112203 124213 124213
The dependent variable is the average interest rate paid by firm I at time t. The regression is estimated with firm fixed effects. The
regression also includes 9 year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%50
ECB
Working Paper Series No 934
September 2008
Table 7
Effect of lender mergers on interest rates by borrower size and age
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
All Firms Micro Small Medium Micro Small Medium
Target (t,T) -0.198*** -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.157*** -0.303*** -0.263*** -0.089
[0.035] [0.042] [0.043] [0.042] [0.056] [0.077] [0.111]
Acquirer (t,T) -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.100*** -0.084** -0.127*** -0.097* -0.067
[0.016] [0.021] [0.019] [0.033] [0.034] [0.050] [0.072]
Number of lenders 0.006 -0.003 0.006 0.015** 0.002 -0.002 0.012
[0.006] [0.017] [0.007] [0.007] [0.019] [0.015] [0.026]
Average assets of lenders  -0.05 0.32 -0.226 -0.127 0.517 -0.088 -0.568
[0.274] [0.308] [0.296] [0.463] [0.419] [0.378] [0.461]
Average ROA of lenders  -2.687* -2.996* -1.956 -3.611 -7.407*** -2.017 -0.769
[1.533] [1.706] [2.188] [3.264] [2.215] [4.372] [8.265]
HHI in province  1.393 0.483 2.331* -0.357 0.304 3.086* -1.62
Young Firms
[1.176] [1.493] [1.351] [1.818] [1.500] [1.584] [1.946]
Log firm age  0.115*** 0.086*** 0.148*** 0.008 0.054 0.065** -0.036
[0.015] [0.019] [0.028] [0.045] [0.033] [0.030] [0.067]
Log firm assets -0.414*** -0.444*** -0.481*** -0.13 -0.438*** -0.445*** -0.216***
[0.049] [0.042] [0.053] [0.081] [0.047] [0.049] [0.078]
Log firm sales  0.040** 0.093*** 0.01 -0.023 0.091** 0.02 0.029
[0.019] [0.031] [0.019] [0.020] [0.038] [0.025] [0.027]
Z-score 0.020** 0.027*** 0.004 0.029 0.025** 0.003 -0.014
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.024] [0.012] [0.013] [0.029]
Leverage 0.005*** 0.003* 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.005** 0.006***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Liquidity 0.129*** 0.139*** 0.148*** 0.058* 0.130*** 0.105*** 0.024
[0.009] [0.017] [0.011] [0.033] [0.017] [0.013] [0.028]
Collateral 0.289*** 0.402*** 0.301*** 0.142*** 0.545*** 0.366*** -0.072
[0.025] [0.043] [0.033] [0.047] [0.054] [0.064] [0.087]
Firm ROA  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.007** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.008*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005]
R-squared 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.19
Observations 674735 244638 338601 91496 153114 111118 19947
Number of firms 124213 50519 59568 14126 30979 20872 3923
The dependent variable is the average interest rate paid by firm i at time t. The regression is estimated with firm
fixed effects. The regression also includes 9 year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the province level in
brackets. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%51
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Table 9
Market overlap and change in market concentration
Panel A. In and out-of market mergers
[1] [2] [3]
In-market Out-of-market  Other  mergers
Target (t,T) -0.207*** -0.100** 0.088
[0.036] [0.043] [0.094]
Acquirer (t,T) -0.064*** -0.249* -0.097**
[0.023] [0.129] [0.040]
Panel B. Market concentration
B.1. Small  ǻ++,t 50 ǻHHI< 50
Target (t,T) -0.147** -0.181***
[0.063] [0.035]
Acquirer (t,T) -0.050** -0.089***
[0.023] [0.019]
B.2. Moderate ǻ++,t 100 ǻHHI< 100
Target (t,T) -0.148*** -0.194***
[0.053] [0.035]
Acquirer (t,T) -0.040* -0.094***
[0.023] [0.018]
B.3. Large  ǻ++,t 200 ǻHHI< 200
Target (t,T) -0.129 -0.202***
[0.116] [0.033]
Acquirer (t,T) 0.041 -0.103***
[0.030] [0.017]
Panel C. In-market mergers and market concentration
[1] [2] [3] [4]
In-market & ǻHHIt100 In-market & ǻHHI<100 Out-of-market Other  mergers
Target (t,T) -0.149*** -0.205*** -0.104** 0.098
[0.051] [0.038] [0.040] [0.092]
Acquirer (t,T) -0.014 -0.064** -0.253* -0.084**
[0.025] [0.029] [0.127] [0.039]
Each panel corresponds to one regression. Only coefficients of interest are reported. The dependent variable
is the average interest rate paid by firm i at time t. The regression is estimated with firm fixed effects. The
regression also includes 9 year dummies and the same explanatory variables as previous models. Standard
errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%53
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